Is Christianity Making a Comeback Among Young Adults? (Pew Data vs. Media Narratives)
Recent data indicates that after decades of steady decline, Christianity's presence in the United States has stabilized, particularly among younger adults. While overall religiosity remains lowest among those aged 18–24, the generational drop in Christian affiliation appears to have halted, with the youngest Gen Z cohort showing similar religious identification and practices to their slightly older peers. Young men, once expected to lead the exodus from religion, are retaining faith at slightly higher rates than young women, narrowing the historic gender gap. Though anecdotal reports highlight a growing interest in traditional expressions of Christianity, such as Eastern Orthodoxy and Latin Mass Catholicism, and cultural influencers have sparked renewed spiritual curiosity among some, these trends remain statistically small and highly concentrated. The data suggest not a resurgence, but a pause in religious decline; the dominant pattern remains one of widespread secularization, with only subtle signs of potential revival emerging at the margins.
Primary Source: Pew Research Center, 2023-24 Religious Landscape Study (Feb. 2025).
Don’t want to read the whole article? <JUMP TO CONCLUSIONS>
Overall Trends in US Religious Affiliation
Figure: Long-term change in U.S. religious identity. The Christian share fell from 78% in 2007 to ~62% by 2024, while “nones” rose from 16% to ~29%, with trends leveling off in the past ~4 years.
After decades of decline, the religious composition of the United States is entering a period of stability. According to the Pew Research Center’s 2023-2024 Religious Landscape Study (RLS), 62% of U.S. adults now identify as Christian, a significant decline from 78% in 2007, but essentially unchanged from the 60-64% range observed in surveys since 2020. Over the same period, the share of individuals with no religious affiliation (often referred to as “nones”) increased from 16% to 29%. However, the rise of the nones has slowed in recent years, plateauing at around 28-31% since 2019. In short, Pew’s latest data indicate that the long-running decline of Christianity in America has slowed and may have leveled off.
The stabilization is reflected across all major Christian traditions. Protestants remain the largest group, accounting for approximately 40% of U.S. adults (down from 51% in 2007). Catholics make up 19% (down from ~24% in 2007). Smaller Christian communities have held steady: for example, members of the LDS Church (Mormons) continue to be ~2% of U.S. adults, and Orthodox Christians account for only about 1%. Meanwhile, Americans affiliated with non-Christian faiths (e.g., Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, etc.) have inched upward to roughly 6-7% combined. According to Pew’s new study, approximately 7% of U.S. adults identify with non-Christian religions, up from 5% in 2007. The overall picture is a religious landscape still dominated by Christianity, but far more pluralistic and secular than a generation ago. Crucially, the recent Pew data show a halt (at least temporarily) to the rapid erosion of Christian affiliation. In the last several years, however, the growth of the nones has slowed, and the Christian share has remained around 60-63% since 2019. Whether this is a lasting shift or a short-term pause remains to be seen, but it provides important context for claims of a Christian comeback. Pew analysts caution that maintaining long-term stability would likely require one of two things: (1) either young adults become more religious as they age, or (2) new, more religious generations emerge, because older, more Christian generations are still gradually being replaced by less religious younger cohorts.
Generation Gaps (Young Adults’ Religious Affiliation and Practice)
Figure: Religious engagement by age cohort (Pew 2024). Young adults score significantly lower on traditional religious indicators, for example, with only about 27% of those aged 18-24 praying daily and 46% identifying as Christian, compared to much higher levels among older Americans. However, on certain spiritual beliefs (e.g., the belief in a soul or spiritual forces), the age gaps are smaller.
If Christianity is experiencing a resurgence anywhere, it is most evident among today’s young adults (ages 18-24). This cohort, largely Gen Z, has grown up with the rise of the nones and widespread secularization. Pew’s data confirm that they remain far less religious than older Americans by most measures. Only about 45-46% of adults under 30 identify as Christian, compared to roughly 78-80% of those aged 65 and above. Conversely, nearly the same share of young adults are religious nones (around 44%) as are Christian. In fact, for the first time in modern data, adults under 30 are roughly equally likely to be non-religious as Christian. This is a dramatic generational gap. As Pew Research makes clear, the youngest adults in the survey (ages 18-24) are less likely than today’s oldest adults (those aged 74 and above) to identify as Christian (46% vs. 80%). The pattern also holds true for religious behavior. Only 27% of 18-24 year-olds say they pray daily, compared to over 50% of seniors. Fewer young adults regularly attend church or express certainty about God’s existence, relative to older generations. In short, by traditional measures of religiosity, today’s 18-24 group is the least religious in the country.
Despite these stark generational differences, there are hints of change in trajectory. Notably, Pew finds that the very youngest adults are no less religious than those a few years older, suggesting a potential plateau in the decline of religious affiliation. Americans born between 2000 and 2006 (ages ~18-24) are just as likely as those born in the 1990s (now 24-34) to identify as Christians, to say religion is very important in their lives, and to report attending religious services at least monthly. In other words, the drop-off in affiliation that occurred between Gen X, Millennials, and older Gen Z has not worsened among the youngest Gen Z cohort. Pew observers note that the youngest cohort of adults is no less religious than the second-youngest cohort on several key measures. Approximately 41% of the youngest adults were raised Christian and remain Christian, a retention rate comparable to that of the slightly older group. This means the inter-generational decline in religiosity has halted at least for now. Every cohort born in the 20th century showed successively lower Christian identification (e.g., 80% of those born in the 1940s vs 46% of those born in the 1990s). But Gen Z’s youngest members did not continue that decline. Those born in the 2000s held steady at the 1990s level, suggesting that the generational decline may have plateaued. Time will tell if this stability persists as Gen Z ages or if it is a temporary blip. Lasting stability would require unusual change (since younger cohorts are still much less religious overall). Still, the data refute the idea of an accelerating secularization among today’s teens and 20-somethings; their religious involvement, while low, is not dropping below the benchmarks set by slightly older peers. This nuance is important when evaluating claims of a Christian comeback among the young. Religious affiliation among young adults has stabilized, but has not yet begun to increase.
It’s also worth noting that on certain questions of spiritual belief, the generation gap is smaller. Young people may be less traditionally observant, but many still express some spiritual sensibilities. For example, ~70% of adults under 35 believe there is something spiritual beyond the natural world, which is only modestly lower than the ~80% of seniors who share the same view. And over 80% of 18-24 year-olds believe humans have a soul or spirit in addition to their physical body—a figure nearly as high as that of older groups. In other words, young Americans are much less formally religious, but not entirely secular in worldview. They often identify as ‘spiritual but not religious,’ a trend Pew has noted in other studies. This suggests that any resurgence of organized religion among young adults may tap into existing spiritual curiosity, even if traditional religious participation (such as prayer and church attendance) remains relatively low.
The Gender Gap (Are Young Men Returning to Church?)
Figure: The narrowing gender gap in US religion. Younger adults exhibit significantly smaller male-female differences on religious measures compared to older adults. For instance, among Gen Z (18-24), women and men pray daily at roughly equal rates (30% vs 26%), whereas in the oldest generation, women’s prayer rate is far higher than men’s. Women still tend to be more religious, but the gap has closed significantly in the youngest cohort.
One aspect of recent data is the narrowing gender gap in religion, particularly among Gen Z. Historically, women have outpaced men on most measures of religiosity, including higher church attendance, prayer frequency, and affiliation rates, both in the United States and globally. That pattern largely persists, but young women have secularized at a faster rate than young men, thereby shrinking the gap. Pew’s 2023-2024 survey finds that women still report higher levels of religious commitment than men overall, but the difference is much smaller among young adults. For example, in 2007, women were 17 percentage points more likely than men to pray daily; today that gap is 13 points. Among the oldest Americans (ages 74 and above), daily prayer is 20 percentage points more common among women than among men. However, among the youngest (18-24), the gap is just four percentage points (30% vs. 26%), and this difference is not statistically significant. In fact, on several key indicators—daily prayer, worship attendance, and certainty of belief—Gen Z men and women look almost alike. Among the youngest adults, the share of women who report praying daily (30%) is similar to the share of men who do the same (26%). The 4-point gap is not statistically significant. This is a remarkable change from past norms and has fueled media speculation that young men might now be more religious than young women.
Is it true that young men are now more religious than young women? A few have made this claim, noting that church attendance and affiliation among Gen Z men appear to exceed those of Gen Z women, an unprecedented reversal. Indeed, survey data outside Pew have observed this curious pattern. For example, PRRI’s research and others in 2024 pointed out that young women have disaffiliated from religion at higher rates, to the point that Gen Z men may, according to some metrics, be slightly more likely to attend church or identify as Christian than their female counterparts. However, Pew’s extensive data do not confirm a clear flip in religious leadership from women to men. Rather, they show a convergence. While the gender gap in American religion appears to be narrowing, there are still no birth cohorts in which men are significantly more religious than women. In every age group, women are at least as religious as men, and usually more so, though among Gen Z, the difference is minimal. However, the perception that young men are returning to church at higher rates than young women is very misleading. What’s really happening is that the religiosity of young women has declined sharply, narrowing the historical gap. Pew reports, for example, that the share of US women who identify as Christian fell from 82% in 2007 to 66% in 2023-2024. Men have also become less Christian (from an estimated 70% in 2007 to perhaps the high 50s now), but because women started at a higher level, their drop has been steeper. The end result is that Gen Z men and women are both relatively secular, with roughly half identifying as Christian, and women no longer having a big edge. For instance, among 18-29 year-olds in a 2024 survey, 47% of men and 36% of women identified as Christian, a finding that garnered headlines as a possible historic reversal. Pew’s study suggests caution. The differences in its data were not as stark, and the overall religious commitment of young women still equals or exceeds that of young men on many measures. Bottom line: Young men are retaining religion at somewhat higher rates than young women (who are leading the exodus to ‘none’), and this has narrowed the gender gap dramatically. But there is not (yet) strong evidence of young men becoming more religious than women in absolute terms. Even among Gen Z, women remain at least as religious as men. The story, then, is less about a male religious resurgence and more about a decline in religiosity between the sexes due to the decline of females. This has interesting implications. Some observers worry it could lead to a gendered sorting in churches (young men gravitating to different styles of worship than young women), a point we’ll explore below. However, claims of a male-driven Christian revival should be viewed in light of the data. So far, faith among young men has only stopped falling, not skyrocketed beyond that of women.
Eastern Orthodoxy and “Trad” Christianity (Rapid Growth or Niche Trend?)
Amidst discussions of Christian renewal among youth, Eastern Orthodox Christianity has garnered considerable attention. Numerous anecdotal reports suggest a surge in young adults, especially young men and former evangelicals, converting to Orthodox churches in search of tradition and rigor. Headlines have proclaimed that young men seeking a more traditional faith are joining Orthodoxy in large numbers. This narrative is amplified by viral stories (for example, this New York Post article in late 2024) profiling young male converts drawn to incense, icons, and ancient liturgy. But what do the numbers say?
First, Pew’s data show that Orthodoxy remains a small segment of US Christianity, about 1% of U.S. adults, and that share has not changed markedly in recent years. In 2007 and 2014, Pew likewise found roughly 1% Orthodox, and the 2023-2024 study again pegs it at 1%. In absolute terms, that’s on the order of 2-3 million adherents at most. Other data suggest even fewer active participants. Between 2010 and 2020, the number of Orthodox church-attending adherents in the US actually declined (from ~817,000 to 676,000 regular attendees). So any recent growth starts from a very small base. Indeed, Orthodoxy is a small tradition in the United States, smaller even than the liberal United Church of Christ, with more Baptist churches in Tennessee alone than Orthodox churches nationwide. This anecdotal data doesn’t prove that there is a shift, but any shift is not yet recognizable in the data. In short, Orthodox Christianity is not (yet) a mass movement among American youth; it remains a niche, constituting roughly one in 100 Americans.
That said, there is evidence of increased interest and conversion activity around Orthodoxy that aligns with the anecdotal data. A recent survey by the Orthodox Church’s seminary network found that “Orthodox parishes in the U.S. have a rising number of converts, many of whom are young ex-Protestants.” This suggests that the trickle of evangelical-to-Orthodox converts has grown stronger, even if the absolute numbers are modest. One statistic from 2022 reported that the number of converts to Orthodoxy had increased by 78% compared to pre-pandemic levels. Without context, that sounds explosive, but remember, a doubling or tripling from a small starting number can be numerically insignificant (e.g., a mission parish growing from 20 to 60 members does not constitute national growth). Pew’s national data did not show any statistically significant increase in Orthodox identification; it remained around 1%. This implies that even with an influx of ex-evangelicals, Orthodoxy’s share of young adults is still very small. Perhaps the anecdotal data is localized on several congregations and offset by continued national decline. Therefore, many experts caution that while percentage increases can seem dramatic when the baseline is small, a 100% jump from 40 to 80 people does not constitute a widespread societal shift.
Importantly, conversion is not a one-way street. Pew’s earlier research found Orthodoxy had one of the lowest retention rates of any Christian tradition, with only about 53% of those raised Orthodox still Orthodox as adults. Many drifted to no religion or to other Christian groups. It’s also worth noting that more Orthodox adherents convert to evangelical churches than vice versa. In other words, even as some Protestant Americans turn toward Eastern Orthodoxy, a number of people with Orthodox family heritage are leaving for Protestant congregations or becoming nones. Some of this is tied to immigration; for instance, immigrants from traditionally Orthodox countries may join American evangelical churches, paralleling how many Latino Catholic immigrants become Protestant when they migrate to the US. Net growth of Orthodoxy nationwide has thus remained limited. Pew’s latest finding, of ~1% Orthodox, suggests that losses roughly offset any gains from converts or are too small to have a national impact.
Why, then, all the buzz about Orthodoxy among young adults? It is a real but niche phenomenon that has been amplified by digital culture. Many young seekers (especially young men) have discovered Orthodox Christianity through YouTube, podcasts, and internet communities. Pew notes that 42% of Orthodox Christians in the U.S. are immigrants (and 69% are first or second-generation Americans), so Orthodoxy historically was not on the radar of most native-born Americans. However, online exposure has now made various Christian traditions accessible. Wings of the church that young men never knew existed now come into view online. On Reddit, an “Orthodox Christianity” forum with over 85,000 members (many of whom are young and male) has become a hub for those curious about the faith. Participants exchange literature about the Church Fathers, discuss theology, and occasionally visit authentic Orthodox parishes. A member of one Orthodox church in California told the press he has seen “several young men” join his congregation after encountering Orthodoxy in these digital spaces. This suggests a self-reinforcing cycle where internet algorithms funnel interested young men toward more Orthodox content (for example, Jordan Peterson’s interviews with Orthodox thinkers have drawn millions of views), which further normalizes the idea of converting to an ancient, liturgical tradition as a bold countercultural move.
The profile of these converts is telling. They are often not coming from atheism or secularism, but from evangelical Protestant backgrounds. Much of Orthodoxy’s recent growth appears to stem not from secular or irreligious individuals converting to Christianity but from disillusioned Protestants discovering the rich history of Orthodox theology and worship via the internet. In other words, this is essentially ‘sheep trading’ within Christianity, a subset of young Christians seeking a different expression of the faith. Many cite a desire for structure, reverence, and clear moral teaching. Orthodoxy’s appeal for these young men is its unchanging, mystical, and demanding nature. One convert described it as a “call to adventure” with “rigid, unbending traditions” that feel “masculine” and challenging. In a culture they see as relativistic and constantly in flux, the ancient liturgy and ascetic disciplines offer a sense of stability. True faith for these young men cannot bend with the culture. A similar trend can be observed in the shift among young people toward “trad” (traditional) forms of worship across denominations, including a growing interest in the Latin Mass among some young Catholics and in high-church liturgy among certain Protestant groups. These are all minority currents, but notable in contrast to the overall secular drift.
Thus, Eastern Orthodoxy’s supposed rapid growth among young Americans is real in anecdotal terms, but very modest in scale and difficult to substantiate from the data (for now, but we will see). Pew’s hard numbers show Orthodoxy holding steady at roughly 1% of the population. The movement of ex-evangelical young men into Orthodox (and also into traditional Catholic) churches is visible in certain circles and urban parishes, yet remains small relative to the tens of millions of nonreligious young people. It is perhaps best viewed as a highly publicized counter-trend or a reaction against mainstream secular culture by a minority of youth, rather than a reversal of secularization among Gen Z as a whole. Whether it continues to grow or remains a limited subculture will depend on whether these converts stay and inspire others, and if Orthodox churches can retain their American-born members more effectively going forward. For now, it’s an intriguing piece of the puzzle, one that speaks to the hunger of some young adults for historical roots, certainty, and discipline in their faith. But it does not represent a mass comeback of Christianity at this time.
The “Red-Pill” Influencers (Do Jordan Peterson, Rogan, and Others Fuel a Faith Revival?)
A fascinating aspect of the conversation around young men returning to religion is the supposed role of online and cultural influencers. Names like Jordan Peterson, Joe Rogan, and Wesley (Wes) Huff often come up. The theory is that these voices, popular among young men in particular, are leading some back toward Christianity (or at least toward serious spiritual exploration). How much truth is there to this?
It’s undeniable that Jordan Peterson, a Canadian psychologist famous for his lectures on meaning, myth, and the Bible, has had a profound impact on many young adults. Peterson’s viral lectures on Genesis and his message about finding purpose through responsibility have inspired young men to seek rootedness and structure in a chaotic world. In fact, observers note that the Orthodox resurgence trend aligns with the broader cultural turn toward neo-Stoicism (a modern revival of Stoic philosophy, emphasizing self-discipline, rational control over emotions, personal responsibility, and resilience) and figures like Jordan Peterson, who encourage a return to order, discipline, and transcendent values. Countless anecdotal testimonies exist of formerly secular young men who, via Peterson, gained a new respect for the Bible and eventually returned to church. For example, Bishop Robert Barron (a Catholic bishop who appeared on Joe Rogan’s hugely popular podcast) remarked that many young men tell him Peterson was a gateway, sparking an interest in Christianity that later blossomed into faith. Peterson himself, though not overtly preaching conversion, often urges his audiences to live as if God exists and highlights the psychological wisdom of Christianity. This has effectively “baptized” secular conversations with religious ideas, making it more acceptable for young men to talk about faith and the Bible. Joe Rogan has also explored spiritual topics on his show. He hosts Christian and religious guests (from creationists to scholars to clerics like Bishop Barron) and frequently discusses topics like the search for meaning or critiques of atheism. Rogan’s openness to those discussions means millions of listeners have heard nuanced debates about God, Christianity, and morality on a platform they trust.
Beyond these two, there is a growing ecosystem of “manosphere” (red-pill adjacent) voices who discuss religion positively. For instance, YouTubers and podcasters who cater to young men now sometimes extol the benefits of faith, tradition, and church community as antidotes to what they see as a nihilistic, postmodern culture. Christian apologists like Wes Huff have leveraged appearances on mainstream podcasts (e.g., he went on a popular comedy podcast hosted by Andrew Schulz, engaging a typically irreligious audience) to defend Christianity in the public square. There’s also the phenomenon of personalities like Jordan Peterson’s daughter (Mikhaila) publicly converting to Christianity, or controversial figures like Andrew Tate (a self-styled “trad masculinity” influencer) suddenly professing religious beliefs. These moments, however fraught, keep religion in the cultural conversation among young men. Even secular commentators have noted this trend. For example, the City Journal writes that for some Gen Z, “faith has become a form of rebellion against a culture that rejects traditional values.” In a time when mainstream institutions are perceived as progressive or woke, embracing orthodox religion can feel countercultural. The young-men-rebelling-through-religion narrative has gained traction, fueled in part by social media influencers who frame going to church or reading the Bible as acts of personal resistance to a vacuous culture.
We must, however, distinguish the cultural narrative from measurable reality. Are these influencers actually causing a statistically significant return to Christianity among young men? The data so far offers only limited support. Pew’s findings, as discussed, show a stabilization of young men’s religiosity, not a dramatic increase. It’s possible that Peterson and others have contributed to this stabilization, preventing further decline by giving some men a reason to reconsider their religious beliefs. There are indeed stories of atheists-turned-believers due to these influences. But on a population level, the cohort of religiously unaffiliated young men remains very large. In 2024, approximately 44% of males under 30 identified as nones. Even if that stops growing, it is a far cry from earlier eras when the vast majority of young men were churchgoers.
Notably, few secular people actually convert to Christianity in adulthood. Pew’s research shows that 94% of current self-identified Christians were raised Christian, and only about 4% of Christians are converts from a non-religious upbringing. Most people who come to faith do so at a young age. This means that the pool of completely secular-raised young men finding religion due to podcasts or YouTube is relatively small. The bigger dynamic at play is retention. Are men who grew up Christian holding onto their faith more than expected? Perhaps marginally, yes. The plateau among Gen Z men could indicate slightly better retention than that of Millennials. If so, cultural voices reinforcing the value of faith might deserve some credit. But it’s hard to disentangle cause and effect. It could equally be that today’s young men, facing social dislocation or loneliness, are organically seeking meaning and community, and influencers are simply reflecting that search rather than creating it. Pew data does show that religiosity among young Americans correlates with other identity trends. Notably, Gen Z men as a group have become somewhat more conservative politically than Gen Z women, who have trended strongly liberal. Since religious affiliation in the US is increasingly tied to political identity (with conservatives far more likely to be Christian), the fact that young men lean a bit more right than young women may contribute to their relatively higher religiosity. In Pew’s study, the share of self-identified conservatives who are Christian declined slightly in recent years (from 89% in 2007 to 82% in 2023), whereas among liberals, it plummeted (from 62% to 37%). So, as Gen Z women tilt liberal and exit religion, Gen Z men include more conservatives who may retain church involvement as part of their identity. Influencers like Peterson often resonate with young men who feel alienated by progressive cultural norms. In turn, those men may see Christianity as part of a more conservative, structured value system. In effect, some young men might be embracing religion as one facet of a broader ideological stance, rather than purely for spiritual reasons.
When we look at church attendance data, it’s still the case that overall, women attend religious services slightly more than men in the US (because older generations still dominate the averages). But there are hints that among young adults, this may be flipping. Some reports from 2022 to 2025 noted that the church attendance of young adult men remained steady or even increased, while the attendance of young women dropped sharply, particularly during and after the pandemic. According to Justin Brierley, a UK study similarly found that more young adult men were returning to church than women, terming it a “quiet revival” among men. In the US, multiple polls indicate an increase in church attendance among young men in certain regions or denominations. If true, this could reflect those influencers making it cool or acceptable for guys to give church a try. But comprehensive evidence is still sparse. The male faith resurgence is, at most, in its infancy, visible in certain subcultures and anecdotal stories, but not (yet) a sweeping statistical reality. Again, Pew’s cautious conclusion is that the gender gap has narrowed, not that men have overtaken women in devotion.
It’s also worth acknowledging that online content has created parallel spiritual ecosystems for men and women. For example, the theology served by the TikTok algorithm to a 21-year-old woman is worlds apart from what’s trending on Orthodox Reddit or Jordan Peterson’s YouTube channel. Young men and young women are fed different religious content tailored to their interests. Men might encounter traditionalist, intellectual, or apologetics content (Orthodox sermons, Peterson lectures, debates on YouTube), while women might encounter more personal, emotive spiritual content (testimonies, worship music clips, etc.). Digital sorting can reinforce different emphases where many Gen Z men gravitate to a structured, doctrine-heavy, no-frills faith, whereas Gen Z women who remain religious often prefer a relational, expressive faith (e.g., contemporary worship music that emphasizes vulnerability and authenticity). Both can be genuine paths to Christian commitment, but they look very different. The male-oriented corners of the internet have undoubtedly fostered communities where embracing Christianity (often in a very conservative form) is applauded, something that might not have been true 15 years ago when New Atheism dominated online discourse. This may foreshadow a broader religious renewal among some young men. But again, the loudness of a trend on YouTube doesn’t necessarily equate to large numbers in real life. Many who follow Jordan Peterson or discuss theology on Reddit may still not formally belong to a church or identify as Christian when polled. It’s possible to admire Christianity’s ideals and even adopt a quasi-Christian worldview without actually professing the faith or joining a congregation. There may be a growing cohort of young men in that category, influenced by red-pilled commentators to appreciate Christianity, which is harder to capture in surveys that simply ask, “What is your religion?” They might still say none, even as they edge closer to religious belief. Future research will need to evaluate these nuances.
Narratives vs. Numbers (Is a Christian Comeback Underway?)
Bringing all the threads together, we can now separate what the hard evidence shows from what is mainly speculation or media narrative:
Overall Christian affiliation in the US. Evidence: Pew’s 2024 data show a stabilization around 62% Christian after a long decline. This suggests Christianity’s decline has slowed and may have leveled off. Some have even framed this as Christianity growing again in America. In reality, the Christian share is roughly flat over the past few years, not yet growing in a statistically significant way. However, the fact that it leveled off (rather than continuing to decline) is significant, and young adults are a major contributor to this. Pew found that those born in the 2000s have held the line at the same (low) religiosity level as those born in the 1990s. That halt in generational decline is the key positive evidence for a comeback. It implies that Gen Z is not abandoning faith more rapidly than Millennials did, and possibly that a minority of Gen Z is more open to religion than expected. Speculation: Some commentators extrapolate this to suggest America’s Christian decline has ended and a revival could be beginning. They point to the 2-3 point uptick in Christian identity from 60% in 2022 to 62-63% in 2024. While encouraging for believers, that change is small and within the margins of error. It’s too early to declare a sustained rebound. Conclusion: The statistics indicate a plateau, which could be the bottoming out of the decline, but only future surveys will confirm whether an upward trend follows. It’s too soon to say whether Christianity’s long decline in America is over, or if a genuine revival is about to take place.
Young men’s religiosity. Evidence: Pew data show the male-female gap has narrowed among young adults, primarily due to women leaving religion faster. There is no statistically significant cohort in which men are more religious than women; however, among Gen Z, the two groups are roughly equal, which is a notable new development. Other surveys suggest that Gen Z men may have slightly higher church attendance rates than Gen Z women in some cases. Speculation: The prevailing narrative is that Zoomer men are spearheading a religious revival, and for the first time, men appear more religious than women. This claim, while attention-grabbing, glosses over the fact that religiosity is down among both genders in Gen Z. Young men are simply down less. Conclusion: There may be a subtle shift in that young men are holding onto faith somewhat more than expected, which is noteworthy. But it’s not a dramatic reversal. We are talking about a situation where roughly half of young men identify as non-Christian (atheist, agnostic, or nothing in particular). The revival is relative to the steeper decline of young women, not an absolute surge of men flocking to church.
Eastern Orthodoxy and traditional liturgy. Evidence: Orthodoxy remains 1% of the population, and overall Christian affiliation among young adults is still dominated by Protestants and Catholics. However, Orthodox churches report more inquiries from converts and new, younger members than in years past. Traditional Latin Mass Catholic communities and other high-church groups have also seen pockets of youth growth. Speculation: Some media imply that Orthodoxy (and similar ancient forms of Christianity) are experiencing rapid growth, even suggesting it could be a major movement that rejuvenates American Christianity. The media reports that converts are coming in droves, and commentators cite the booming number of seminary students or the emergence of young clergy in traditional churches. The reality is that these are still small subcultures. They are important as a signal, as they show what kind of religious expression is resonating with a subset of disaffected youth (namely, one with deep historical roots and strict practices). But by the numbers, the vast majority of young American Christians are not converting to Orthodoxy or Latin Mass parishes; they remain in mainstream evangelical or Catholic contexts (or no religion at all). Conclusion: The Orthodoxy trend is a valid storyline for many and does contribute to the sense of a Christian renaissance among some young men, but it should be kept in perspective. It’s a minority within a minority. If Christianity does make a broader comeback among Gen Z, it will likely incorporate some of that desire for tradition and substance, but it won’t mean tens of millions of Americans becoming Orthodox overnight.
Impact of cultural influencers. Evidence: We have qualitative indications (testimonies, content popularity) that figures like Peterson and Rogan have made Christianity more salient and attractive to young men. There’s also evidence that young men discuss and consume religious content online in male-dominated spaces, potentially reinforcing interest in faith. Pew data indirectly reflect this in the stabilization of young male religiosity and the traditionalist turn of some (e.g., more young men choosing old-fashioned worship). Speculation: It’s easy to overstate this and imagine there’s a mass conversion wave sparked by internet personalities. Some Christian writers excitedly talk of a “quiet revival” or a “manosphere rebirth of belief” due to these influencers. We should be cautious. The influence is real in individual lives, but no survey has yet shown a significant uptick in atheists turning to religion en masse because of podcasts. It’s more likely that those already inclined or raised in a religious tradition are encouraged to strengthen or retain their faith. Conclusion: Those like Peterson have likely contributed to creating a more faith-friendly climate among segments of young men, which is significant. However, this is an intangible cultural shift that may not immediately translate into higher percentages of religious affiliation. It could be sowing seeds that bear fruit later. Or it could plateau, with many fans of Peterson stopping short of fully embracing organized religion. Only time (and further data) will tell.
In conclusion, there is indeed a glimmer of a Christian comeback among young adults, but it is a nuanced and limited one, rather than a sweeping reversal. The Pew data from 2024-2025 gives a mixed verdict. On one hand, the decades-long decline in the number of Americans identifying as Christian has slowed and may have stabilized. On the other hand, young adults aged 18-24 are still the least religious age group by far, and secularism remains deeply entrenched in that cohort. Christianity’s hold on young men has proven a bit more resilient than many anticipated (with the gender gap narrowing as a result), and a subset of those men are enthusiastically embracing very traditional forms of faith. These are positive signs for those hoping for a revival. Yet for every young man rediscovering church via Jordan Peterson or converting to Orthodoxy, there are likely many more young people continuing to drift away from religion or never raised with it to begin with. In 2023-2024, 35% of U.S. adults reported switching from their childhood religion (most often from Christianity to no affiliation). And a record 40% of adults now say they attend religious services less often than they did in childhood. Those broader secular trends provide a headwind against any nascent comeback.
Some young adults, especially men, are choosing to stay in the faith when many expected them to leave. This could indicate a future upswing. At the same time, it is equally clear that Christianity is not yet regaining lost ground among Gen Z in a statistical sense. The best we can say is that it has stopped losing ground for the moment. Much will hinge on the choices made by the young in the years to come. Will those drawn to the current cultural moment actually commit to and pass on their faith, or will this prove a temporary blip? In the meantime, it is crucial to distinguish between hype and reality. There is no sweeping flood of youth returning to the pews, but there is a noticeable current, a quiet rebellion of young adults embracing a more traditional, fervent Christianity in defiance of the secular mainstream. Pew’s research helps us quantify what is happening (stability, small shifts) and what is not (a wholesale resurgence). Christianity isn’t dead among young Americans. In fact, its decline has stalled, but talk of a full-fledged comeback is premature. The evidence suggests a delicate balance between continuing secularization and embryonic revival. In short, the story is still unfolding, and it’s one to watch with careful attention to both the data and the cultural winds.
